Subject: Post-Saddam Iraq: The War Game THAT PROVED
THE CRIMINAL FIASCO TO BE
Date: Sat, 04 Nov 2006 22:40:12 -0600
Lest any believe the U.S. government went into Iraq raw, naively
unprepared, innocently, foolishly, ignorantly, idiotically, perish
the thought now and forever. For all problems were
anticipated,
for the whole bloody mess to be, was rehearsed and consequences well
known, as:
Now, seven years later, documentation on preparations for the games
[RELATING TO AN IRAQ INVASION ac] and detailed After Action records
have surfaced in response to a Freedom of Information Act request by
the National Security Archive, which is posting the materials on its
Web site today.
"The conventional wisdom is the U.S. mistake in Iraq was not
enough
troops," commented National Security Archive director Thomas
Blanton, "but the Desert Crossing war game in 1999 suggests we
would
have ended up with a failed state even with 400,000 troops on the
ground."
Date: Sat, 4 Nov
2006 12:13:56 -0500
Reply-To: National Security Archive
<archive@GWU.EDU
Sender: The National Security
Archive
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From: National
Security Archive <archive@GWU.EDU
Subject: Post-Saddam Iraq: The
War Game
To:
NSARCHIVE@HERMES.GWU.EDU
National Security Archive Update, November 4, 2006
POST-SADDAM IRAQ: THE WAR GAME
"Desert Crossing" 1999 Assumed 400,000 Troops and Still a
Mess
http://www.nsarchive.org
For more information contact:
John Prados - 301/565-0564 or Roger Strother - 202/994-7000
Washington, DC, November 4, 2006 - A series of war games held in
1999 specifically to anticipate problems following an invasion of
Iraq assumed a deployment of 400,000 troops to maintain order, seal
borders and provide for other security needs. But the games, known
as Desert Crossing, were apparently ignored by the Defense
Department. When CENTCOM commander Gen. Anthony Zinni, after his
retirement, advised planners to refer back to Desert Crossing as
they prepared for the 2003 invasion, the response reportedly was,
"Never heard of it."
Now, seven years later, documentation on preparations for the games
and detailed After Action records have surfaced in response to a
Freedom of Information Act request by the National Security
Archive, which is posting the materials on its Web site today.
"The conventional wisdom is the U.S. mistake in Iraq was not
enough
troops," commented National Security Archive director Thomas
Blanton, "but the Desert Crossing war game in 1999 suggests we
would have ended up with a failed state even with 400,000 troops on
the ground."
Desert Crossing, which amounted to a feasibility study for part of
the main war plan for Iraq -- OPLAN 1003-98 -- tested "worst
case"
and "most likely" scenarios of a post-war, post-Saddam,
Iraq. The
After Action Report presented its recommendations for further
planning regarding regime change in Iraq. The results drew some
pessimistic conclusions regarding the immediate possible outcomes
of an invasion. A number of these mirror the events which
actually
occurred after Saddam was overthrown.
* "When the crisis occurs, policy makers will have to deal with
a
large number of critical issues nearly simultaneously, including
demonstrating U.S. leadership and resolve, managing Iraq's
neighbors, and rapid policy formulation."
* "A change in regimes does not guarantee stability. A number
of
factors including aggressive neighbors, fragmentation along
religious and/or ethnic lines, and chaos created by rival forces
bidding for power could adversely affect regional stability."
* "Iran's anti-Americanism could be enflamed by a U.S.-led
intervention in Iraq. ... The influx of U.S. and other western
forces into Iraq would exacerbate worries in Tehran ... More than
any other country in the region, the principals were most concerned
by how Iran would respond to a U.S.-led intervention in Iraq."
* "Iraqi exile opposition weaknesses are significant ... The
debate
on post-Saddam Iraq [during the war game] also reveals the paucity
of information about the potential and capabilities of the external
Iraqi opposition groups ... [T]here was no dispute that if the
United States were to support them, much must be done in order for
these groups to be politically credible within Iraq."
These documents were posted today on the Web site of the National
Security Archive:
http://www.nsarchive.org
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