Subject: How to Fight Terrorism.US Constitution,Bill of Rights Must
Go. Read On.
To: ambrovista@yahoo.com; rogue_radio@yahoo.com; ambrovista7@yahoo.com
Everything Must Go: How to Fight Terrorism 'Terror and Consent':
brilliant, contrarian
http://www.jonesreport.com/article/04_08/15bobbitt.html
http://www.statesman.com/search/content/life/stories/books/03/30/0330bobbitt.html
James E. McWilliams / Austin-American Statesman | March 30, 2008
During the course of a long, intellectually demanding narrative,
"Terror and Consent" pivots on several paradigm-shifting
claims. One of them, which appears in the introduction, stands out for
its humanitarian implications: "During the era of twentieth
century industrial nation states ... 80 percent of the dead and
wounded in warfare were civilians." For Philip Bobbitt, a
distinguished lecturer and senior fellow at the University of Texas
and a law professor at Columbia University, this is more than a
gee-whiz factoid. It's the basis upon which he advances an ambitious
argument for fighting the wars that are bound to plague the 21st
century. The prospect that the good old industrial nation state is a
shrinking violet might rankle patriotic flag-wavers. But Bobbitt's
statistic thrusts home an unsettling question: What does it say about
the nation state that it has so often failed to provide, in the words
of British statesman Douglas Hurd, "the security, prosperity, and
the decent environment which the citizens demand"? Might it be
time for something new? In Bobbitt's view, the current wars against
terror provide a shrill wake-up call to confront this question. The
best way to protect citizens of modern democracies, he claims, is to
fundamentally rethink the nation state as the guarantor of the
freedoms that terrorists intend to obliterate. Bobbitt's previous
book, "The Shield of Achilles," explored the grand themes of
warfare and state development, marking his penchant for the magnum
opus. At nearly 700 pages (including more than 100 pages of notes),
"Terror and Consent" follows suit, taking on a similarly big
picture. If "we want to defeat state-shattering terror in the
twenty-first century," Bobbitt writes, we will have to
"transform the emerging constitutional order of the twenty-first
century State." Specifically, we must stop thinking like a nation
state and start thinking like the "market state" that we are
inevitably becoming. The nation state — a constitutional order
dedicated to protecting and improving the material welfare of its
citizens — served the United States well from the mid-19th century
to the end of the Cold War. But Bobbitt contends it's vulnerable to a
new battery of threats. The accessibility of weapons of mass
destruction, the globalization of international capital and the "universalization
of culture" have eroded the conventional borders that once
legitimated national security. What's needed is a constitutional order
that takes its structural cues from multinational corporations and
nongovernmental organizations, relying "less on law and
regulation and more on market incentives" to expand people's
options. Such a market state keeps its finger on the pulse of consumer
demand, advocates trade liberalization, is prone to the privatization
of public works and "will outsource many functions." In the
seminar rooms of political science departments this change is referred
to as "neoliberalism" (on the streets, it is known as
"globalization") — and Bobbitt, who is a geopolitical
realist, believes we have no choice but to embrace it. The market
state, Bobbitt contends, has great potential for the cause of
individual freedom, but it also has a dark side. Global terrorism has
already taken advantage of its ethos of openness in order to undermine
it. For example, the wide-open arms market that neoliberalism endorses
has allowed terrorists to gain access to weapons of destruction that
they then use to destabilize legitimate market states. "Market
state terrorism," Bobbitt explains, thus feeds on the
"ardently sought innovations" of the 20th century to exploit
"the increasing vulnerability of market states to catastrophic
events." "One cannot say," Bobbitt warns,
"precisely how long we have." What is to be done This is not
fear-mongering but rather a sophisticated geopolitical assessment.
Therefore, a great deal rests on the solutions Bobbitt offers.
Fortunately, his suggestions are, if not entirely novel, largely
sensible. But they are ambitious to the point of being unachievable
without extraordinary political leadership and unprecedented corporate
discipline. First, Bobbitt argues that the market state must allow the
timeworn strategies of deterrence and containment to yield to the more
aggressive tactics of preclusionary warfare. In an "epochal
war," which we're in, market states share the burden of employing
power "preclusively rather than waiting for an acute crisis to
set in that irrevocably puts us at a disadvantage." Venturing
educated guesses about the behavior of future threats is no one's idea
of an ideal tactical strategy, but Bobbitt argues that if we
strengthen our alliances with other states, networks of shared
intelligence could do an impressive job of it. Of course, this would
require a more invasive process of information gathering within and
across national borders. In order to reduce the threat to civil
liberties this would entail, Bobbitt highlights "(o)ur commitment
to globalize the systems of human rights and government by
consent." He insists that emerging market states must
collectively, out of "self respect," define and protect our
inalienable rights. What this means in concrete terms is that
governments "must rethink ideas like 'Homeland Security,' when
the threats to security cannot be neatly cabined as in or out of the
homeland," that an "alliance of democracies" must form
to discourage isolationism and that the United States must
"change its role as hegemon" in NATO. Only then can a
consortium of neoliberal democracies draw "a bright-line rule
against the intentional infliction of pain on any person detained by
government," one of the many human rights threats that Bobbitt
believes we must address. These developments — the acceptance of
preclusionary war, the universalization of human rights — hinge on a
revamping of international law. Bobbitt believes that the UN Charter
should be amended to allow the preemptive use of force without a
Security Council authorization, that the Geneva Conventions should be
changed to forbid the indefinite containment of terrorist prisoners
without trial and that we must, in cases in which the use of
non-lethal chemical weapons could be used to prevent terror, be able
to redefine such methods as "counterforce measures." The
messy reality These prescriptions provide a useful blueprint for
fighting terror. As with any blueprint, however, there is the messy
reality of filling in the details. Bobbitt presents his arguments
persuasively; there is nothing dumbed down about "Terror and
Consent." Nevertheless, one wonders if he concedes too much to
the many virtues of neoliberalism without fully appreciating its
negative impact. Two issues stand out. First, Bobbitt admits that
there will be no obvious answer to many of the human rights issues
that are bound to arise. In many situations, he explains, our only
option is to vest faith in properly formulated international and
constitutional systems of law. This sort of vagueness is frustrating,
perhaps dangerously so. Take one case that Bobbitt offers: What should
a market state do when an Islamic state holds free elections that
bring a bin Laden to power? This situation, after all, presents allied
market states with a human rights quandary — some sort of ethical
corner will have to be cut. Bobbitt's approach to these kinds of
problems is often to dance a bit too delicately around them. He
argues, "States must measure their tactical and strategic
policies against the impact these policies are likely to have on their
legitimacy," and "Whether (a) state is subject to
intervention ... ought to be measured by the relationship between the
strategic interests of the states of consent and the severity of the
deprivations of human rights." Both answers tell us we need to
take measurements but offer no ruler with which to do so. Further left
unexplored in this response is the possibility that the market state
offers a conception of inalienable rights that it has not yet
developed the means to protect. One can't help but wonder, as
globalization renders millions of people vulnerable to human rights
violations, if the nation state and its emphasis on human welfare
should be so thoroughly dismissed. Second, there is the matter that
Bobbitt does not spend much time addressing: the war in Iraq —
specifically, the subcontracting tactics that a CEO president and his
corporate-modeled Cabinet have embraced. The inefficiencies of
Halliburton, the corruption of Bechtel and the violence perpetuated by
Blackwater call into question Bobbitt's advocacy of privatizing public
duties. How does a market state draw "bright-line" rules on
human rights when the actors in charge of drawing those lines hold
privately funded erasers? These questions, like so many others that
this book poses, lack easy answers. But the long century we face might
demand that we answer them not by choosing good over bad, but — as
is usually the case in war and politics — the lesser of evils. If
this is so, then "Terror and Consent" offers the most we can
expect from our blinkered vantage point: a dauntingly learned and
occasionally infuriating manifesto. Philip Bobbitt: Phone: (512)
232-1376 Fax: (512) 471-6988 E-mail: PBOBBITT@LAW.UTEXAS.EDU
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